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COMPENSATION, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, AND THE
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC-SECTOR LABOR LAW
Matthew Dimick*
INTRODUCTION
T UMULTUOUS protests over the elimination or curtailment of
collective-bargaining rights in Ohio, Wisconsin, and other battleground
states have triggered an enormous discussion over public-sector labor unions and
labor law. The compensation of public employees is a key part of this debate,
which has tended to focus on the monetary costs of public employee
compensation, such as wages, salary, and health and pension benefits. These
debates have produced widely diverging estimates of just how much--or how
little-the compensation of employees in the public sector departs from that of
their counterparts in the private sector.1
Despite the great furor over public-sector worker compensation, the debate
leaves unasked, and unanswered, many important questions. For instance, the
legislation aimed at curtailing collective bargaining assumes that public-sector
unions are the source of public-sector labor costs. 2  Yet the public-private
compensation comparisons have tended not to make distinctions among public-
sector workers, the national majority of whom in fact do not belong to labor
unions. 3 Legislation aimed at curtailing public-sector unionism will do little if
the alleged costs of public-worker compensation lie elsewhere.4 The debate has
also tended to emphasize the overall magnitude of public-sector compensation,
without more closely analyzing the specific sources of these costs and their
relative contributions. Indeed, prior to the Ohio and Wisconsin political battles,
more longstanding discussions on public-sector workers, and especially public-
* Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School, State University of New York. I wish to
thank the editors of the Toledo Law Review for the invitation to speak at the symposium on public-
sector labor law and for their diligent help in editing the article.
1. Compare JEFFREY KEEFE, ECON. POLICY INST., DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF THE
OVERCOMPENSATED PUBLIC EMPLOYEE: THE EVIDENCE 1 (2010), available at
http://www.epi.org/page/-/pdf/bp276.pdf (finding that public employees are paid on average lower
than comparable private-sector employees), with Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Those
Underpaid Government Workers, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 2010, at 28, available at
http://spectator.org/archives/2010/09/24/those-underpaid-gothose-underp. (arguing that public
employees enjoy higher compensation on average than comparable private sector employees).
2. See infra Section II.B.4.
3. See infra Section II.A. 1.
4. This is not to say that labor unions are not a factor in public sector costs, but only to point
out the lack of clear reasoning in the debate.
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sector teachers, drew more focused attention on the costs of job security. Once
again, a major overhaul of collective bargaining legislation seems a crude tool to
address cost concerns if those costs are specific and can be addressed with finer-
tuned instruments.
In an attempt to bring more precision into the debate over public worker
compensation, this contribution seeks to generate some theory about how we
should expect labor unions to affect public-sector compensation as compared to
the private sector. At the heart of the analysis lies a model of collective
bargaining that highlights the tradeoff between wage compensation and
employment security. Based on this model, I find compelling reasons why
compensation in the public sector might be lower than in the private sector, even
with divergent proportions of unionization. Indeed, allegations of excessive
public-sector pay, such as those made by Andrew Biggs and Jason Richwine,
argue that the higher rate of unionization among public-sector workers
(particularly at the state and local level) is a key reason why we should expect
public-sector compensation to outstrip compensation in the private sector.5
However, as the model developed in this article demonstrates, once the risk
preferences of workers and the peculiarities of public-sector production are made
an explicit part of the analysis, the otherwise intuitive assumption that
unionization would lead to excessive levels of compensation in the public sector
is no longer compelling.
Thus, the argument developed in this article conforms with the results of
those researchers who consistently find public-sector wages to be below those of
their private-sector counterparts.6 However, the argument I make is not all good
news for proponents of public-sector unions and workers. Indeed, some of the
very same factors that lower wages in the public sector-namely workers'
preferences over risk and employment security-also impose their own much
5. Biggs & Richwine, supra note 1. Responding to claims of lower pay in the public sector,
the authors write:
This conclusion does not survive scrutiny. For one thing, state and local employees are five
times more likely to be covered by union contracts than private sector employees. Since
union members predictably receive higher pay than non-union members, policies to allow
collective bargaining by government employees are tantamount to decisions to raise pay.
While some analysts would have you believe that state and local employees are paid just like
private sector workers, the truth is that they are paid more like unionized private sector
workers, which is a different kettle of fish.
Id.
6. See generally, e.g., Dale Belman & John S. Heywood, State and Local Government Wage
Differentials: An Interstate Analysis, 16 J. LAB. RES. 187 (1995); George J. Borjas, The Wage
Structures and Sorting of Workings into the Public Sectors, in FOR THE PEOPLE: CAN WE Fix
PUBLIC SERVICE? (J.D. Donahue & J.S. Nye eds., 2003); KEEFE, supra note 1; Sang-Hyop Lee, A
Reexamination of Public-Sector Wage Differentials in the United States: Evidence from the NLSY
with Geocode, 43 INDUS. REL. 448 (2004); Gregory B. Lewis & Chester S. Galloway, A National
Analysis of Public/Private Wage Differentials at the State and Local Levels by Race and Gender
(Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 11-10, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1768190; Michael Miller, The Public-Private Pay Debate: What Do the
Data Show?, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 18 (1996).
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less visible costs. In particular, the costs of employment protection are felt
mostly in the form of lost productivity. Consequently, even if the claims of
excessive compensation are overblown, public-sector unionization may indeed
impose significant costs, albeit of an altogether different kind.
Despite this somewhat mixed message, my ultimate conclusion is that the
curtailment or abandonment of public-sector collective bargaining to address the
more legitimate problems of public-sector productivity would be both short-
sighted and self-defeating. Reforms should address improving the functioning of
public-sector collective bargaining, not abolishing it altogether. This article
proposes a number of labor-market policy changes that can achieve these
objectives.
Part I of the article reviews the law-and-economics literature on collective
bargaining and employment security. It then provides an analysis of collective
bargaining and employment protection to argue that the two represent tradeoffs
for risk-averse workers.
Part II then probes the particularities of public-sector collective bargaining
to make further predictions about the relationship between compensation and
employment protection in the public sector. It considers the politics of public-
sector unionism, the sheltered nature of public-sector production, the
decentralized nature of public-sector collective bargaining, and the problem of
adverse selection.
Part III investigates alternatives to the existing regime of public-sector
collective bargaining and considers four alternatives: (1) greater coordination or
centralization in public (and perhaps public-private) collective bargaining,
(2) improved unemployment insurance, (3) job training and retraining programs,
and (4) privatization of public services.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
Although the focus of this article will be on the public sector, collective
bargaining and employment protection in the private sector share many of the
same features and have similar consequences. It is therefore necessary to review
the general debates over collective bargaining and employment protection, which
will be done in Parts L.A and I.B. Part I.C. draws on this discussion to build a
model of collective bargaining over wages and employment security.
A. Collective Bargaining
Economists and legal scholars continue to debate the economic
consequences of collective bargaining. The original analyses focused on two
models: the "monopoly union" model, where the union unilaterally sets the
wage, subject to the employer's unilateral choice over how many workers to
hire;7 and the "right-to-manage" model, where the union and employer bargain
7. JOHN T. DUNLOP, WAGE DETERMINATION UNDER TRADE UNIONS 82-94 (1944) (explaining
various models involving product markets and labor markets).
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over the wage, subject to the employer's unilateral choice over how many
workers to hire (hence, the "right to manage"). 8 In either case, roughly the same
outcome is obtained: as unions impose or bargain a wage above the competitive
market level, employers reduce the number of employees they hire, leading to
greater unemployment. Higher unemployment means economic inefficiency:
with more workers unemployed, the economy is not producing as much output as
it otherwise could.
It is important to point out that in these models it is assumed that unions
seek to maximize the wage bill, which takes into account both the increase in
wages and the number of workers in the hiring pool (which in turn is assumed to
equal the union's membership). 9 In other words, unions are utilitarian: they want
the greatest good for the greatest number. This sort of behavior implies that the
wage that the union sets is not as high as if the union cared only about wages.
Despite that, according to the theory, unions find that they can maximize the
wage bill by raising wages even though employment at the firm declines (and
unemployment increases). 10 Certainly other assumptions could be made about
how unions behave, but the results are not strikingly different, and the model is at
least broadly consistent with empirical realities.
After the original analysis of the monopoly union model, the economist
Wassily Leontief pointed out that in that model neither employers nor unions
were getting the best outcome they could." In what is called the "efficient" or
"off-the-demand-curve" model of union behavior, the union and the employer
bargain over both wages and the level of employment.' 2 This seems a
reasonable assumption. For one, "bargaining," as opposed to the unilateral
setting of terms, is a better description of what goes on when employers and
unions negotiate. Furthermore, without question, unions bargain over more than
wages. While it is infrequent to observe collective agreements that explicitly
mention the number of employees, unions certainly bargain over staffing levels,
manning requirements, and a range of other issues that affect the firm's
employment level. As it turns out, when unions and employers bargain in this
fashion, unions are able to pass on some of the firm's surplus to workers in the
form of higher wages without any drop in employment.' 3 Such agreements are
thus efficient in two senses: first, it is production or output efficient, since
employment remains at the competitive, market-clearing level; 14 and, second, it is
8. S.J. Nickell & M. Andrews, Unions, Real Wages and Employment in Britain 1951-79, 35
OxFORD EcON. PAPERS 183, 184 (1983). One can view the monopoly-union model as a special
case of the right-to-manage model where the union has all of the bargaining power with respect to
setting the wage.
9. DuNLoP, supra note 7, at 195.
10. Id. at 207-09.
11. Wassily Leontief, The Pure Theory of the Guaranteed Annual Wage Contract, 54 J. POL.
ECON. 76, 76-77 (1946).
12. Ian M. McDonald & Robert M. Solow, Wage Bargaining and Employment, 71 AM. ECON.
REv. 896, 896 (1981).
13. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search
for Bargaining Equity andIndustrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. Rrv. 419, 435-36 (1992).
14. Id. at 422.
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Pareto efficient, in that both the union and the employer improve their welfare
(higher profits for the employer, a larger wage bill for the union) over the
monopoly union or right-to-manage model. 15 Indeed, in this bargain, any further
gain for the union or employer can only come at the expense of the other.
Some members of the public are more accustomed to thinking about labor
unions as the very opposite of efficient: to put pejorative phrases in the best light,
unions are frequently depicted as a group of workers seeking to advance their
own interests at the expense of the firm and perhaps everyone else.1 6 But a little
reflection about this suggests the opposite and reinforces the conclusion about
efficient bargaining in the previous paragraph. If unions are utilitarian-or, more
crudely, if they want the most for their members-then they have a strong
incentive for efficient production.17 A union of this sort will want to increase
efficiency, not decrease it. Only if the firm is using the most efficient level of
employment will the union be able to achieve the maximum rent for its
members. 8 If two people are bargaining over how to divide a pie, each can get
more by insuring that the size of the pie is as large as possible.
When "efficient" bargaining is introduced, labor unions begin to look better
than their "monopolistic" reputations would suggest. However, as we shall
shortly see, the efficient-bargain model also requires certain assumptions about
workers' attitudes toward risk.19 When some of these assumptions are relaxed,
collective-bargaining inefficiencies again reintroduce themselves. Before we
investigate this question, let us survey the economics of employment protection.
B. Employment Protection
Another contentious matter of debate among law scholars and economists
concerns the consequences of employment protection. At first glance,
employment protection is something of a puzzle for economic theory (if not for
casual intuition). So before surveying the literature on the impacts of
employment protection in Part I.B.2, Part I.B.1. details how economic theory
explains employees' preferences for job protection.
15. An allocation of resources (e.g., wages and profits) is said to be Pareto superior to a
different allocation if it increases at least one person's utility without decreasing another person's.
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509, 515
(1980). Of course, under this definition, allocations that improve both persons' utility are Pareto
superior as well. An allocation of resources is said to be Pareto optimal or Pareto efficient if no
other allocation can improve a person's utility without decreasing another person's. "Pareto-
optimal distributions have no distributions Pareto superior to them." Id. at 517.
16. Scholars often use the term "monopoly face" to refer to "any union effect that decreases
efficiency or total value (the 'size of the pie') to firm stakeholders (workers and owners) and
consumers." Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions Do for Economic Performance?, 25 J. LAB. RES.
415, 420 (2004).
17. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 13, at 439-40.
18. Id.
19. See infra Part I.C.
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1. Why Employment Protection? Imperfection in Labor Markets
Within the most basic framework of economic theory, employment
protection presents a conundrum. If labor markets in particular are working as
the textbook case would have it, there would be no need for employment
protection. If labor markets were perfectly competitive, workers' compensation
in employment would equal exactly what they would get out of employment-
whether self-employed, engaged in "home" production, or alternative
employment, if it could be gained instantaneously. Of course, reality is
something different, and most jobs pay wages above what one can get by
working in the home; further, becoming reemployed after losing one's job often
takes some time. From the standpoint of economic theory, the question is, why?
One proposed explanation has to do with the problem of contracting for how hard
employees work. Since employers or their agents cannot perfectly observe how
hard, diligent, or careful employees are in their work, employers may pay wages
above the competitive level, called "efficiency wages." ° In this scenario there is
no incentive to work if workers are paid exactly what they can get outside of the
labor market, since effort cannot be contractually enforced and workers are
indifferent to losing their jobs. 2' Thus, if employers pay efficiency wages, job
loss is associated with a substantial penalty, and this provides some incentive for
workers to be diligent in order to avoid losing the higher wages.2 2 One
consequence of this is a permanent fraction of unemployed persons seeking
work, because wages are higher than needed to equate labor demand with
supply.
23
A possibly more intuitive explanation has to do with the "frictions" of the
job search process.24 The process of matching workers to jobs is imperfect.
Employees typically do not receive an offer for every job to which they apply.
Similarly, employers sometimes have more willing takers than the number of job
vacancies or sometimes have fewer acceptances than the number of vacancies.
Given this imperfection and the possibility that a job vacancy may remain
unfilled, employers may offer supra-competitive wages in order to ensure a long
20. In general, the problem of contracting in the presence of "hidden action"--actions that are
difficult to observe or verify-is called moral hazard. Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 433, 434 (1984).
21. Specifically, this theory is called the shirking model of efficiency wages. For the best
known presentation of this version of the theory, see id at 433. Other authors have posited
alternative versions of efficiency wage theory. See generally Janet L. Yellen, Efficiency Wage
Models of Unemployment, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 200, 200 (1984) (discussing alternative reasons that
employers may pay above-market wages, including to reduce shirking, to lower turnover, to
improve the average quality of job applicants, or to improve morale among the workforce).
22. Shapiro & Stiglitz, supra note 20, at 433.
23. Id.
24. Peter A. Diamond, Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium, 49 REV.
ECON. STUD. 217, 217 (1982).
25. Id. (contrasting the competitive market with a "search process" that randomly "brings
together unemployed workers and vacant jobs pairwise").
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enough "queue" of job seekers to fill the vacancy. 26 This wage-posting behavior
drives a wedge between the perfectly competitive wage, which exactly matches
workers best alternative, and the wage the employee actually receives.
27
Whatever the cause, in either the efficiency wage or job-matching theory,
wages are higher than workers' next best alternative, and there is a permanent
pool of unemployed workers. Supra-competitive wages imply that job loss has a
cost; the existence of a pool of voluntarily unemployed workers implies that
finding new employment is not instantaneous. Consequently, workers are no
longer indifferent about losing their jobs, and will want some form of
employment protection.
Finally, collective bargaining can itself be a source of divergence between
actual and market-clearing wages. By raising wages even further above the
efficiency or job-matching wage, collective bargaining may amplify workers'
preferences for employment security, even if it is not necessary for those
preferences. Indeed, the added attraction of employment security in the
collective-bargaining context, owing to the higher wages and therefore higher
penalty for job loss, 28 is perhaps one of the most likely reasons why "just cause"
protection against arbitrary termination is found most frequently where unions
bargain for workers.
29
2. The Economics of Employment Protection
Employment rents-whether from efficiency wages, job-matching frictions,
or amplified by collective bargaining-constitute at least one reason, and are
perhaps the most important reason, for employees' preferences for job security.
The next issue is what impact employment security has on the efficient
functioning of labor markets. In other words, employees may want employment
protection, but is employment protection a good thing for the economy?
The standard argument in favor of some form of job security is to protect
employees from employer opportunism. In this argument, employment security
is required to encourage workers to invest in firm-specific skills and prevent
employers from taking advantage of workers (for example, by terminating them
or lowering their wages) once those firm-specific skills are acquired (and
therefore of little value elsewhere). In his widely-cited article, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, Richard Epstein countered this argument and made the case that
26. Two different versions of this process are modeled in James D. Montgomery, Equilibrium
Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials, 106 Q.J. ECON. 163, 166-75 (1991), and
Espen R. Moen, Competitive Search Equilibrium, 105 J. POL. ECON. 385, 388-99 (1997).
27. Daron Acemoglu, Good Jobs Versus Bad Jobs, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 1, 9 (2001)
(demonstrating theoretically that wage differences disappear as the model converges on the
perfectly competitive, "Walrasian" market allocation).
28. This possibly also applies to higher unemployment and longer spells of unemployment as
well. See generally LAWRENCE MISHEL & MATTHEW WALTERS, ECON. POLICY INST., How UNIONS
HELP ALL WORKERS (Briefing Paper No. 143, Aug. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers-bp143/ (discussing the benefits of unions to both
union and non-union workers).
29. Id.
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just cause was inefficient. 30  If a legally-binding, just-cause agreement really
leads to efficiency-enhancing investment in employee skills or training,
employers would gladly offer it voluntarily. 31 If they do not offer such contracts,
then they will not be able to encourage workers to invest in firm-specific skills.
However, as Epstein argued, the fact that most employees agree to at-will
contracts suggests the opposite conclusion, that just cause is inefficient.32
One response to Epstein's economic argument was that individually agreed
upon just-cause employment contracts would be driven out of the market by
"lemons," or adverse selection. 33  Just cause could increase efficiency, for
example, by slowing down job turnover and creating longer spells of
unemployment, which would encourage workers who fear losing their jobs to
worker harder for less pay, which would in turn expand employment and
productivity.34 However, any contract offered by employers that provided a just
cause term would attract too many underperforming workers, or "lemons,"
causing such employers to be driven out of the market.35 An employer would
offer a just-cause term only if she could be ensured that all other employers
would also offer them.36 In this case, underperforming workers would then be
indifferent toward any particular firm and would be distributed evenly across the
economy. In this argument, legislation is necessary to mandate just cause across
all employers in order to achieve the efficient outcome.37
Nevertheless, critics of employment protection had a ready response to the
"lemons" argument. This response is that employers could offer different
contracts that would efficiently "sort" different kinds of workers into different
kinds of jobs-without any need for government imposed regulation. Each
potential employer would offer two different contracts: one with higher wages
and no job protection and one with lower wages and job protection.
Underperforming workers, who are more likely to be fired, and who therefore
value job security more, will opt themselves into the second contract, while
higher performing workers will opt for the first. The outcome is a "separating
equilibrium" that optimally sorts the type of worker into the appropriate contract,
avoids the adverse selection problem, and does so without any need for
government intervention. Like Epstein's argument, the contracting argument
30. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951-53
(1984).
31. Id. at 973-74.
32. J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 837, 875.
33. Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the
Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1953, 1957-63 (1996); David I.
Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 9 J. LAB.
ECON. 294, 296-301 (1991) [hereinafter Levine, Adverse Selection].
34. David I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies When Unemployment Is a Worker
Discipline Device, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 902, 902 (1989) [hereinafter Levine, Unemployment].
35. Kamiat, supra note 33, at 1964-65; Levine, Adverse Selection, supra note 33, at 295.
36. Levine, Adverse Selection, supra note 33, at 295.
37. Levine, Unemployment, supra note 34, at 905.
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suggests that legally mandating employment protection is both unnecessary and
unwise.
Another contribution to the debate over just cause questions how
knowledgeable workers are about their employers' dismissal policies. 38 The vast
majority of employment contracts may be at will, but if workers misunderstand
the security of their employment, this outcome does not imply that the actual
absence of just cause is an optimally contracted-for outcome. In fact, most
workers erroneously believe that the law mandates some form of just-cause
protection, when the opposite is the case.39 Based upon these findings, advocates
of just cause have argued that the law ought to be aligned with workers'
expectations and that the law should adopt just cause as the "penalty default"
rule.40 With just cause as a penalty default, employers, who typically bargain
with individual workers on a "take it or leave it" basis, would be forced to make
more explicit what the actual legal relationship of employment creates. It would
also presumably allow workers to bargain for higher wages if the employer
preferred an at-will agreement.
In addition to these arguments about optimal employment contracting,
labor-market researchers have explored employment protection in a more
macroeconomic view, by analyzing its impact on the rate of unemployment.
41
The surprising finding is that employment protection may have little effect on the
rate of unemployment. While it is common to think of regulations as a tax on
economic activity, such a. view is too imprecise when applied to employment
protection legislation. In fact, it is probably better to think of employment
protection legislation as a tax (or more simply as a cost) onfiring workers, rather
42
than a tax on hiring workers (such as a payroll tax). In this view, employment
protection may have little or no impact on the rate of unemployment, since the
43
only additional cost is in letting a worker go, not in hiring a new one.
However, this noneffect of employment protection on the unemployment
rate does not imply that employment protection legislation has no economic
consequences. Unjust dismissal laws may slow the rate of workers entering the
unemployment pool and, consequently, slow the rate of hiring workers, thereby
causing the rate of workers exiting the unemployment pool to also slow.4 4 To the
extent that workers' skill and human capital depreciates more quickly when
unemployed, longer unemployment spells imply a lower stock of human capital
38. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions
of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105, 109-10 (1997); Pauline T. Kim,
Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers'Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL.
L. REv. 447, 453-54 [hereinafter Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law].
39. Kim, Norms, Learning, andLaw, supra note 38, at 449.
40. Guy Davidov, In Defence of (Efficiently Administered) "Just Cause" Dismissal Laws, 23
INT'L J. CoMp. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 117, 122 (2007).
41. Olivier Blanchard & Pedro Portugal, What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate:
Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 187, 188 (2001).
42. GILLES SAINT-PAUL, DUAL LABOR MARKETS: A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 6-11
(1996) (construing employment protection legislation as a "firing cost").
43. Id. at 7.
44. Blanchard & Portugal, supra note 41, at 191.
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and, consequently, lower economic output.45 Employment protection may have
another negative consequence for labor productivity: higher firing costs lower the
productivity threshold employers use to determine whether to retain or dismiss a
worker.46 In other words, employment protection forces employers to maintain
underperforming workers in employment. This last argument plays a crucial role
in the model constructed in this next subsection.
C. A Model of Wage and Security Bargaining
Thus far, the article has reviewed the economic and legal literature on
collective bargaining and employment protection legislation. To understand the
impact of collective bargaining on compensation and employment security in the
public sector, we need to put these two strands of research together. This section
does that by explicitly considering a model of collective bargaining over wages
and employment security. This model will provide a general, "baseline" case,
from which more specific attributes of the public sector and their impacts on
collective bargaining will be considered in Part II.
The conclusion of the "efficient" bargaining model of labor unions was that
unions would have an interest in obtaining the economically efficient outcome.47
However, this outcome requires one critical assumption, namely that workers are
neutral with respect to risk.48 In contrast, when workers are risk averse,
inefficiency will reintroduce itself, even when unions and employers bargain
over both wages and employment. In the language of economics, workers are
risk averse when they do not accept "fair bets," and they are risk neutral when
they do.49 To illustrate what this means, suppose you have a choice between, on
the one hand, receiving $100 with a 90% chance or $0 with a 10% chance; on the
other hand, you can choose to receive $90 with certainty. A risk neutral person
would be indifferent about these two choices because they are, actuarially
speaking, identical: (0.90 x $100) + (0.10 x $0) = $90. On the other hand, a risk-
averse person would strictly prefer the $90 with certainty over the equally
favorable, "fair" bet. In other words, the risk-averse person is willing to trade
away the possibility for a larger payoff for greater certainty in the outcome-or
in other words, a risk-averse person is willing to pay for greater certainty.
Similarly, when the union bargains on behalf of risk-averse workers, it will
be willing to make sacrifices in productive efficiency for the sake of employment
security. In other words, more risk-averse workers place greater weight on
having a job (and avoiding the fall in income associated with job loss) than they
45. SAINT-PAUL, supra note 42, at 164 (conveying the "traditional argument" that "long spells
of unemployment are associated with skill deterioration").
46. Blanchard & Portugal, supra note 41, at 196-97. For empirical evidence of the
productivity-lowering consequences of employment protection, see generally Andrea Ichino &
Regina T. Riphahn, The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: Absenteeism During
and After Probation, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASs'N 120 (2005).
47. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 13, at 433.
48. See PIERRE CAHUC & ANDRE ZYLBERBERG, LABOR ECONOMICS 397-99 (2004).
49. For an introduction to the concept of risk aversion, see ANDREU MAs-COLELL ET AL.,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 183-91 (1995).
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do on getting the largest wage possible. The direct implication of this is that if
job-protection rules make the firm they work for less productive and,
consequently, lower the wage for which unions can bargain, risk-averse workers
will be willing to accept this trade-off. Risk-neutral workers on the other hand
would prefer to have the level of employment protection determined by the
competitive market (perhaps hypothetical), which is the level that maximizes the
firm's productivity.
FIGURE 1: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
w
Union indifference curve
Risk-averse
contract curve
Risk-neutral
contract curve/ ,
, - Employer isoprofit curve
Wrn S..................................................................W r a .............." ' " "....;; . .... . s. ............................................................. ................
b .... . ................ .. ...... I.................. .--. .... ................................................................................
Yra Yc Yrn
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
The figure above may help illustrate this relationship. The figure represents
any possible combination of wages (w) and a measure of employment protection
(5i) in a contract between an employer and a union. To avoid confusion, note that
as one moves right on the Y dimension, employment protection generally
becomes more favorable to the employer. Indeed, one should think of Y as a kind
of "production standard." The y (without the bar) represents the productivity of
the employee,50 while the y (with the bar) represents the threshold at which
employers may dismiss an employee. If y exceeds y, the employer keeps the
employee, while if y is below y, the employer dismisses the employee.
Accordingly, as 5 moves to the right, the higher an employee's productivity (y)
has to be in order to avoid being dismissed.
On this two-dimensional graph a number of lines and curves are
represented. The two curves each represent the union's indifference curve and
the employer's isoprofit curve. Both curves represent different combinations of
wages and employment protection that result in, respectively, either the same
level of utility for the union or the same level of profit for the employer. To
become better off, the union prefers points that are above and to the left of its
indifference curve (the union wants higher wages and more employment
protection), while the employer prefers points that are below and to the right (the
employer wants lower wages and less employment protection). These two curves
intersect at two points, creating a "lens." Note that within this lens are points that
both the union and the employer prefer to those on their respective indifference
(isoprofit) curves. This lens is accordingly called the Pareto set, because it
represents contracts that make both of the parties better off without making the
other worse off.5 1 Finally, the dashed line, starting from the bottom left and
radiating out toward the upper right, is a 45-degree line, representing all points
where the wage and the production standard are equal. Its relevance will be
discussed presently.
Suppose that without a union, wages were equal to point b. Then, under an
employment-at-will regime, an employer would set the production standard equal
to this wage. We call this Y, to refer to the production standard set in the
"competitive" wage environment. The employer chooses this standard, because
any employee who produces more than she costs in wages represents a net gain
to the employer and is worth keeping. Conversely, any employee who produces
less than she costs in wages will constitute a loss for the employer. Hence, the
45-degree line represents the production standard that the employer would
choose (say, under a regime of employment at will) for any given wage.
Now suppose that the employer bargains with a union. We can predict that
wages will be higher than in the competitive labor market, but by how much?
Furthermore, how does employment protection change when it is a subject of
bargaining, and does it influence wages? The answers to these questions depend
on whether workers are risk averse or risk neutral. Recall from our previous
50. None of the results require assessing individual employee abilities. One could also assume
that y measures the productivity of the match between the employer and employee, that is, how
good a "fit" the employer and employee make, and not just the employee's independent abilities.
51. Coleman, supra note 15, at 513.
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discussion that when workers are risk neutral, they want the biggest slice of the
economic pie possible. 52 The union will therefore want to bargain for wages
equal to Wn (for risk neutral) and for a production standard equal to Yc, the
standard of production determined in the competitive labor market.53 With an
identical standard of production as results without a union, there will be no loss
in productive efficiency. More generally, the union and employer will bargain
for any point along the vertical, risk neutral contract curve within the Pareto set.
If the Pareto set tells us the set of contracts that make both the union and the
employer better off, the contract curve locates a set of points within the Pareto set
where the union cannot be made better off without making the employer worse
off, and vice versa. When the employer and union have reached the contract
curve, they have exhausted all possible gains from trade. The point chosen on
the contract curve depends on the relative bargaining strengths of the union and
the employer.
Also note that maintaining the Yc standard of production is no longer self-
enforcing from the employer's perspective. If the employer now has to pay
higher wages, it would now like to employ only more productive employees.
Given wages of w, the employer's preferred production standard is now the
corresponding point on the 45-degree line: 7rn Thus, in order to enforce its
preference for a less strict production standard, the union will have to bargain for
a just cause term, which requires the employer to show that an employee's
performance fell below some agreed upon level before an employee can be
dismissed. Note also that this implies that the mere presence of just cause
language is not evidence, by itself, of inefficient levels of employment
protection.
When workers are risk averse, however, a different outcome results. When
workers are risk averse, they no longer want to take home the largest possible
pay. They have preferences for having a job, not just for how much it pays.
Unions representing risk-averse workers will therefore tend to prefer higher
levels of protection over maximizing the economic product. This preference is
reflected in a "tilting" contract curve, displayed in Figure 1, as compared to the
perfectly vertical, risk neutral contract curve. This "tilt" becomes greater the
more risk-averse workers are. The result is a lower wage (wra) and a higher
level of employment protection (Yra) than in the risk neutral case. The main
economic implication of this is that with a production standard more favorable to
employees, the employer will be obligated to maintain in employment less
productive employees.
The central conclusion is that compensation and employment security are
tradeoffs. To the extent that employment protection is high in the public sector,
we should expect that this will be accompanied by correspondingly lower
wages-if not lower than without collective bargaining, then lower than might be
52. See Milton Harris & Yoram Weiss, Job Matching with Finite Horizon and Risk Aversion,
92 J. POL. ECON. 758, 759-60 (1984).
53. The assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market, which leads to the production
maximizing standard, is only hypothetical. But it establishes a useful benchmark by which we can
measure the relative efficiency of other labor market arrangements.
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expected. This implies that the wage costs of collective bargaining are likewise
limited by workers' risk preferences and the tradeoffs they make in favor of
employment security. However, the limits that employment security places on
wage increases are not cost free. Employment security may require the employer
to keep in employment less productive employees.54 Just like wage costs, lost
productivity is a cost ultimately born by the public.
II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The model analyzed in Part I.C. concluded that wages and employment
security are tradeoffs. In particular, if workers are more risk-averse, wages will
be lower and employment protection will be higher. However, at this stage there
is nothing in the model that distinguishes between collective bargaining in the
public versus the private sectors. Are there any reasons to think that public-
sector workers will be more risk averse than private-sector workers? This Part
considers some of the differences between work and production in the public and
private sectors to examine whether any of those differences can lead to greater
risk-aversion in the public sector. In particular, four different attributes are
analyzed: (1) the politics of public-sector bargaining, (2) the "sheltered" quality
of public-sector production, (3) the decentralized nature of collective bargaining
in the United States, and (4) adverse selection. While the first factor might cause
both wages and job security to rise in the public sector, all of the remaining
factors suggest that workers in the public sector may be more risk-averse, and
consequently more willing to trade away wages for security.
To be clear, the precise comparison being made here is between collective
bargaining in the public and private sectors. Because unionization rates among
public and private workers differ so greatly, caution must be used in any
extrapolations one may draw about public and private differences generally.
Nevertheless, if the factors described here are strong enough, they are entirely
consistent with, and may help explain why, the empirical studies cited earlier find
lower compensation in the public sector despite higher levels of unionization.
A. The Politics of Public-Sector Unionism
In the typical employment relationship, we think of the employee as the
"agent," hired to carry out the tasks assigned by the employer, the "principal."
Yet a real question arises about who is the principal and who is the agent when
looking at the public sector. Public-sector employers are ultimately accountable
to the electorate, and the electorate includes public-sector employees, many of
whom are more organized and carry greater influence than their fellow
unorganized electors. Under these circumstances, political authorities may not
wish to bargain as hard with public-sector unions and may be more willing to
54. See Ichino & Riphahn, supra note 46, at 140.
55. Terry M. Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 4-5
(2006).
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grant concessions on policy or funding than would otherwise be the case.56 This
response may also be encouraged by the fact that the costs of these concessions
are diffused across a large number of tax payers. 57 As such, political authorities
do not bear the direct costs of these concessions, and the cost bom by the
individual tax payer is insufficient to provoke them to overcome their collective-
action dilemma.
5 8
How do the particular political advantages of public-sector unions affect the
trade-off between wages and employment security? In this case, the political
power of public-sector unions can increase both their wages and employment
security, relative to the private sector. Thus, we should expect both wages and
employment security to be higher when labor unions have special political
influence as compared to when they do not. However, depending on the risk
preferences of the workers, these gains will be allocated in different proportions
to wages and employment security. That is, although enhanced political
influence will allow unions to increase both wages and security, if public-sector
workers are risk averse, they will be prefer the greater balance of their gains to go
to employment protection rather than to wage increases.
B. The Consequences of Sheltered Markets
An important peculiarity of collective bargaining in the public sector is the
"sheltered" nature of much of public production. 59 Government services, such as
prisons, sanitation, airports, education, utilities, healthcare, and human services
are frequently provided as monopolies-the government agents who deliver
these services do so under no competitive pressure.60 Of course, privatization of
public services constitutes an important exception to this absence of competition,
a phenomenon we will return to later in Part III.
Although the special political orientation of public-sector unions suggests
an increase in wages and security compared to the baseline case, the
consequences of government monopoly, and the nature of government
production more generally, is far more ambiguous. First, consider a monopoly of
any kind, public or private. If a monopolistic organization bargains with a union,
union wage increases will raise the cost of labor, reduce the organization's
56. Id. at 4.
57. James T. Bennett & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Public Employee Unions and the Privatization
of "Public" Services, 4 J. LAB. REs. 33, 33 (1983).
58. Id.
59. Peter Feuille, Unionism in the Public Sector: The Joy of Protected Markets, 12 J. LAB.
REs. 351, 353 (1991) (noting that public employers "do not have the same incentives to resist
unions as their private sector counterparts do because of the absence of competitive product market
pressures"). Cf Competitive Contracting for More Effective & Efficient Government: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform & Oversight, 104th Cong. 9
(1995) (statement of Wendell Cox, Dir., Am. Legislative Exch. Council), available at
http://www.publicpurpose.com/pp-pvtza.htm (arguing that "the competitive market is not applied to
the factors of public service production" and therefore that the "result is higher than necessary
costs").
60. Feuille, supra note 59, at 352.
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demand for labor, and cause employment within the organization to decline.
Now consider a firm in a competitive industry. Union-bargained wage increases
likewise raise the cost of labor, but there is a second effect of wage increases that
also reduces the demand for labor.61 When labor costs rise, a competitive firm's
products also become more expensive, which puts them at a disadvantage relative
to other firms in the industry. This reduces consumers' demand for the products
of the firm with the wage increase, while it increases demand for other firms'
products. Reduced product demand constitutes a second reason for reduced labor
demand in the competitive industry, since it implies a lower demand for labor to
produce a smaller output. Because utilitarian unions care about wages and labor,
when competitive conditions make labor demand more sensitive (more elastic, in
economists' language), they will limit their wage demands.62 Conversely, wage
demands will be higher in monopolistic industries. This sort of reasoning
likewise has similar implications for employment security. Since monopolistic
industries are less sensitive to labor costs in general, whether from wage costs or
employment-protection costs, unions should be able to bargain more stringent
employment-security rules in monopolistic industries. Thus, the absence of
competition in government production could lead to a conclusion that both wages
and employment security will be higher in public-sector bargaining than in
private-sector bargaining. However, again, wage increases and greater
employment security will come in different proportions. In particular, risk-averse
workers will make greater demands for employment protection than for wage
increases.
Yet monopoly production in the public sector has another important-and
countervailing--consequence for public-sector collective bargaining. Economists
have lonA argued that monopolistic industries have weaker incentives to
innovate. This implies, again to the degree that this is true in the public sector,
that innovation and, consequent% productivity, should be smaller in the public
sector than in the private sector. Lower productivity should have the opposite
effect on collective-bargaining outcomes than in the previous paragraph. With
lower productivity, labor is already essentially more costly, and these costs will
limit the ability of unions to raise wages and employment protection in the public
sector. In addition, another reason that the public sector may be less productive
than the private sector is that the public-sector production is dominated by
services, which are widely thought to be less susceptible to productivity increases
61. Chris Edwards, Public Sector Unions and the Rising Costs of Employee Compensation, 30
CATO J. 87, 100 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj30nl/cj3Onl-5.pdf.
62. Cf id (observing that while higher costs of public sector workers are borne by taxpayers,
"private sector unions need to keep in mind that higher business costs may result in lost sales and
fewer jobs").
63. Kenneth J. Arrow, RAND Corp., Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTVTY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 619-22 (1962); Bhaskar Sastry, Market Structure and Incentives for Innovation, INTERTIC 4
(June 2005), http://www.intertic.org/Policy%20Papers/Sastry.pdf.
64. See GermA Bel et al., Is Private Production of Public Services Cheaper Than Public
Production? A Meta-Regression Analysis of Solid Waste and Water Services, 29 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 553, 555 (2010), available at http://www.ub.edu/graap/JPAMBFW.pdf.
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than in manufacturing or goods production.6 5 Thus, lower productivity and the
service orientation of government production should lead one to expect lower
compensation for public-sector workers and in public-sector collective
bargaining.
C. Bargaining Structure: Decentralized versus Centralized Bargaining
Collective bargaining in the United States has always been very
decentralized.66 The locus of bargaining authority is normally at the level of the
"Local" union organization and conducted with a single firm, or even a single
plant or workplace, and sometimes even between a single establishment and a
mere subset of workers in a given workplace.67 In European countries, an
important amount of collective bargaining is more likely to take place at the
industry-wide level, and in some instances, even at the national level.68 There
have of course been exceptions in the United States to the usual rule of
decentralization. Multi-employer agreements have been known in auto, steel,
and trucking, for instance. 9 But even here, this multi-employer bargaining
comprises subsections of industries that would be subsumed under more
encompassing bargaining in other countries. For example, in Europe there might
often be a single metalworking union that bargains with steel-producing and
steel-using industries (such as auto); or a single transportation union that would
cover ground, rail, and air transport.7°
Collective bargaining in the public sector is no different from the private
sector in the United States and is likewise highly decentralized.71  My guess
would be that most collective bargaining takes place at a municipal level and
even there would be further divided between different groups of workers. At a
large public university, for instance, it is not uncommon to have separate unions,
each conducting separate bargaining, for faculty, graduate student assistants,
administrative staff, and building and maintenance staff. Some of these divisions
may make sense, some may not. There is regional decentralization as well,
which is aided and abetted by the law, where each state has its own legal regime
65. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS: THE ECONOMIC
DILEMMA 161 (1966) (drawing attention to the phenomenon of continuing and compounded rises in
the real costs of service production, including live performing arts, automotive repair, health care,
education, postal services, automotive and accident insurance, and care of the indigent). See also
William J. Baumol, Health Care, Education and the Cost Disease: A Looming Crisis for Public
Choice, 77 PUB. CHOICE 17 (1993) (exploring the consequences of the lack of productivity growth,
the "cost disease," in public sector services).
66. See Michael Wallerstein & Bruce Western, Unions in Decline? What Has Changed and
Why, 2000 ANN. REv. POL. SCI. 355, 364.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 366 tbl.3.
69. Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into a "Unique"
American Principle, 20 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 47,59 (1998).
70. Id.
71. See Wallerstein & Western, supra note 66, at 361.
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for governing collective bargaining (to the extent that it has any law in this area
at all).
Decentralized bargaining presents at least two consequences for
compensation and employment security outcomes in collective bargaining. The
first is that decentralized bargaining does nothing to reduce-and may help
exacerbate-wage differentials among and between public and private employers
in the labor market. Wage differentials increase the uncertainties about the
consequences of job loss and therefore increase the demand for job protection.
The second is that decentralized bargaining may present a "hold up" problem that
leads to lower investment and therefore lower productivity and lower wages.
While decentralized bargaining is not unique to the public sector in the United
States, each of these factors, in combination with the higher union density in the
public sector, can help explain why public sector wages may nevertheless lag
behind the private sector.
1. Decentralized Bargaining and Industry and Firm Wage Differentials
The first important implication of decentralized bargaining for employment
security is its effect on industry and firm wage differentials. Industry or firm
wage differentials refer to the degree to which wages differ between industries or
firms for work that is otherwise the same; such work would therefore be expected
to yield identical wages.72 These wage differentials have important implications
for employees' risk preference. Greater wage dispersion introduces even greater
uncertainty about the welfare workers will receive if they lose their jobs. Not
only must they worry about the lost wages from being unemployed, but they
must also worry about the prospects they face once (or even if) they become
reemployed. Much research demonstrates that involuntary job loss is associated
with significant and permanent declines in income even once reemployed.73 This
outcome is likely aided and abetted by significant levels of industry and firm
wage differentials. Wage dispersion thus makes the prospect of job loss even
riskier for workers. Consequently, it will lead them to demand greater levels of
job protection.
Firm and industry wage differentials have been repeatedly demonstrated
empirically 74 and present a problem for standard, market-clearing models of the
labor market that would predict "one price" for identical labor. There are many
reasons that wages might disperse around a hypothetical "normal" wage. The
efficiency wage and job-matching theories examined in Part I each provide one
answer. A crucial element in either version is firm heterogeneity, or differences
72. CAHUC & ZYLBERBERG, supra note 48, at 295.
73. Markus Gangl, Scar Effects of Unemployment: An Assessment of Institutional
Complementarities, 71 AM. Soc. REv. 986, 987-88 (2006).
74. See William T. Dickens & Lawrence F. Katz, Inter-Industry Wage Differences and
Industry Characteristics, in UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE STRUCTURE OF LABOR MARKETS 48, 83-84
(Kevin Lang & Jonathan S. Leonard eds., 1987); Sumner H. Slichter, Notes on the Structure of
Wages, 32 REv. ECON. & STAT. 80, 80-84 (1950). See also Alan B. Krueger & Lawrence H.
Summers, Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure, 56 ECONOMETRICA 259, 263-68
(1988).
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across firms in terms of productivity because of, for example, different
economies of scale or different amounts of capital investment. Under the
efficiency-wage theory, a shirking worker presents a greater potential loss of
output for a more productive firm than for an identical worker in a less
productive firm. For identical "supervision" technologies then, the more
productive firm is willing to pay the worker more to induce greater effort.7 5 A
similar reasoning holds for the job-matching theory.76 Job vacancies are more
costly to a productive firm than to a less productive one. More productive
employers will therefore pay higher wages to ensure a longer queue of job
seekers, and therefore a smaller chance of a vacancy.
Decentralized collective bargaining is another source of wage dispersion.77
Ultimately, the source of this dispersion is the differences in productivities
between firms, just as they were the source of wage dispersion in the efficiency-
wage and job-matching theories. Quite simply, when employers and unions
bargain over the firm's (or municipality's) revenues, unions will be able to
achieve higher wages because of greater productivity, or what amounts to nearly
the same thing, because of lower employment costs per unit of output. Thus,
because of collective bargaining, we should expect wages to be higher in firms
with more productive technology, even for labor that, by itself, is equally
productive. Although slightly more complicated in the public sector, we should
expect the same result. For identical budgets (which are influenced by the factors
previously discussed), facilities or enterprises with greater productivity should
result in higher wages for employees under collective bargaining.
As a result, we should expect decentralized collective bargaining, whether
within the public and private sectors respectively, or between the public and
private sectors, to increase wage dispersion. Wage dispersion, in turn, makes job
loss even more risky for workers and should increase their demand for
employment protection measures relative to wage increases.
2. Decentralized Bargaining and the Hold-Up Problem
A second implication of decentralized wage bargaining is its effect on what
economists call the "hold-up" problem.79 Consider an employer contemplating a
costly fixed investment in machinery or computer technology that will
significantly increase productivity (or reduce unit labor costs) in the workplace.
For a private employer, this represents the prospect of higher profits; for a public
employer, this may represent the potential to deliver the same or more services at
lower cost, thereby saving the tax payer money. By increasing productivity, it
75. Krueger & Summers, supra note 74, at 280.
76. See Montgomery, supra note 26, at 169-70.
77. Karl Ove Moene & Michael Wallerstein, Pay Inequality, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 403,405 (1997).
78. Id. at 427.
79. Amaia Altuzarra & Felipe Serrano, Firms' Innovation Activity and Numerical Flexibility,
63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 327, 329 (2010). See generally Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages
in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52 ECONOMETRICA 449
(1984).
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will also present the union with the opportunity to significantly increase wages.
However, if the resulting wage increases are very large, this may make the
investment less attractive to the employer. If most of the productivity gains are
absorbed by wage increases, profit or cost-saving gains will be much less. They
may even make the investment economically infeasible if, for example, the
wage-reduced profit gain becomes less than the cost of the investment itself.
Perversely, this hold-up problem has the effect of lowering wages. If
employer's anticipates that any investment gains will be lost in wage increases,
managers will not make such productivity-enhancing commitments. Yet without
productivity improvements, there is also no basis for increases in wages. Of
course, unions would like firms to make such investments in order to take
advantage of increased productivity. But without some device to address the
hold-up problem, they cannot credibly commit to limiting their wage demands
once irreversible investments have been made.
There are a number of ways to address the hold-up problem in collective
bargaining. Foremost among them is by making collective agreements legally
enforceable, particularly when they are accompanied by a promise not to strike
during the term of the agreement.g° Under such an agreement, employers have
some certainty about their wage costs during the contract term and some
confidence that the union will not be able to threaten to stop production to secure
wage gains. By providing some certainty about the future, such measures reduce
the hold-up problem.
Another, and possibly even more effective, way of reducing the hold-up
problem is to centralize bargaining. When unions and employers bargain as
groups, and wages are uniform across employers, wages become independent of
any particular firm's productivity and investment. In fact, by raising wages on
less productive employers, relative to what they would pay in a decentralized
environment, centralized bargaining may increase employer's incentives to
invest. In other words, centralized bargaining acts as a subsidy to innovators and
a tax on laggards, while decentralized bargaining acts as a tax on innovators and
a subsidy to laggards.
Therefore, in addition to increasing wage dispersion, decentralized
bargaining worsens the hold-up problem, which reduces productivity and
consequently wages. More to the point, the hold-up problem is an important
reason limiting wage growth in the public sector relative to the private sector,
precisely because of, rather than in spite of, the public sector's greater union
density.
D. Adverse Selection
Over the past few decades, union density in the private sector has declined,
while union density in the public sector has roughly increased. 81 As a result, the
union membership rate among public sector workers stood at 36.2% in 2010,
80. See generally Grout, supra note 79.
81. See Michael Wallace et al., Union Organizing Effort and Success in the U.S., 1948-2004,
27 REs. SOC. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 13, 13 (2009).
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which was substantially higher than the union membership rate among private
sector workers, which was 6.9% in 2010.82 If only local government workers are
considered, the membership rate among the public sector was even higher, at
42.3%.83 These disparities imply that labor markets are working very differently
between public and private sectors. Indeed, the question arises whether the
substantial difference in union membership rates could create an adverse
selection problem, similar to the one described above. Or even more interesting,
are there peculiarities of the public sector itself that cause a disproportionate
number of workers with greater preferences for job security to seek employment
there? To the extent that this occurs we would expect that the tradeoff between
wage increases and employment security to be struck even further in the direction
of security. This subsection discusses the reasons why this might be the case.
First, the government as an employer may be particularly well placed to
ensure workers against risk. For one, governments are relatively large emplo4Yers
and have the resources to pool risk across a larger number of employees. 8 In
addition, the public sector may be slightly insulated, if not totally immune, to
business cycle behavior in the economy. 85 If this is the case, then we would
expect workers with different risk preferences to sort themselves into public and
private sectors. The private sector might offer higher wages to relatively risk-
neutral workers to compensate them for the uncertainty of future product demand
and employment. The public sector could save on wage costs and use its relative
stability to attract more risk-averse workers. Even if collective bargaining then
increases wages in the public sector, these increases will be less than in the case
of equal proportions of risk-averse workers across sectors.
A second feature of the public sector that might lead to adverse selection is
its lower productivity. As shown in the analysis of Part II.B., sheltered public-
sector production may be systematically lower than in the private sector. And as
shown in the previous subsection, Part II.C., wages will diverge depending on the
productivity characteristics of firms and industries. For these reasons, we can
also expect risk-neutral workers to be drawn to higher-wage, higher-productivity
firms and sectors, and risk-averse workers to be drawn to lower-wage, lower-
productivity firms and sectors. The reason for this is that lower wages act as a
kind of insurance against job loss. 86 Recall that risk-averse workers are willing
to sacrifice higher wages for more certainty. Low-wage occupations fulfill this
condition, albeit in an inefficient way. 87  High-wage jobs attract more job
applicants, creating longer "queues" for these jobs. Yet with longer queues-
82. News Release, Union Members-2010, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 1
(Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01212011 .pdf.
83. Id.
84. William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, Employer Size and Compensation: The Role of
Worker Characteristics, 26 APPLIED EcON. 897, 906 (1994).
85. Steven G. Allen, Unions and Job Security in the Public Sector, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR
WORKERS UNIONIZE 271, 278 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988).
86. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, Efficient Unemployment Insurance, 107 J. POL. ECON.
893, 901 (1999) [hereinafter Acemoglu & Shimer, Efficient U1].
87. Id. at 906.
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which is to say, more competition for the job vacancy among workers-the risk
of getting hired is lower than in a lower-wage job. Thus, risk-averse workers
discount higher wages and prefer the greater likelihood of finding employment in
a lower-wage industry. Thus lower productivity in the public sector can account
for why a higher proportion of risk-averse workers might be attracted to the
public sector, and therefore why collective bargaining in the public sector may be
tilted toward security even more than compensation, than in the baseline model.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
There are therefore several perfectly plausible reasons why the
compensation of public-sector workers might be lower than for comparable
private-sector employees, even despite the much higher prevalence of collective
bargaining in the public sector. First, the monopolistic and service-oriented
nature of government production may result in lower productivity and therefore
lower collectively-bargained wages. Second, decentralized bargaining in the
public sector may lead workers to emphasize job security concerns over wage
increases and, through hold-up effects, exacerbate the slow growth of
productivity in the public sector. Third, and perhaps most convincingly, the
peculiarities of government production may attract a disproportionate number of
workers with strong risk-averse preferences, who will again emphasize job
security in contrast to wage increases in collective-bargaining proposals. Yet
even if for these reasons public-sector wages lag behind private-sector wages, the
emphasis on job security in public-sector bargaining may impose its own, less
visible, costs in the form of lower productivity. The next question is, what should
be done?
One possible response to the problems posed by the costs of employment
security and collective bargaining is to do away with unions altogether. This has
been, more or less, the consistent response by a number of observers over the last
few decades. The legislative moves to curtail or eliminate collective bargaining
in Ohio and Wisconsin are, in many respects, the culmination of such thinking.
Nevertheless, it would be unwise to eliminate collective bargaining in the public
sector. Whatever problems are created by public sector bargaining, abolishing it
will only exacerbate existing problems or create new ones. The debate should
not be between whether we want unions or not, but rather, what kind of unions
we want. This Part will first discuss the dangers of eliminating public-sector
bargaining, and then discuss the kinds of changes that could be made to
maximize the good things unions do and minimize the bad things.
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A. Downsides of Eliminating Public-Sector Bargaining
1. Increasing Income Inequality
Growing economic inequality presents a significant challenge to the United
States. Income inequality is now higher than at any point in the last 70 years.88
For several years, economists interpreted this growing inequality as a
consequence of what they called "skill-biased technical change" (SBTC). 89
Namely, changes in technology (the advent of computers being the most favored
example) create greater demand for high-skilled workers and reduce demand for
low-skilled workers. 90 More recent research raises significant doubts about the
ability of this "villainless" and exogenous SBTC story to fully explain increasing
inequality. For instance, when one examines the pattern of job creation, one
finds a distinctive, U-shaped pattem.91 The American economy has created many
"good," high-paying jobs, many "bad," low-paying jobs, and very few jobs in
between.92 Since this evidence shows that business has revealed a distinctive and
growing, rather than declining, demand for low-wage workers, this throws into
question the simple SBTC story.
Economists have since revised their story, from one of SBTC to one of "job
polarization." 93 In this revised version, technological change still plays a big
part. Rather than new, computerized technologies shifting demand for different
skills among workers, however, these technological changes eliminate and
simplify "middle-level" tasks, generating demand for both high and low-skilled
workers, but reducing demand for mid-level skilled workers.94 But it is even
possible to question how much job polarization itself is the cause of rising
income inequality. Crucial to this question is how income is distributed among
top wage earners.9 5 As it turns out, when sufficiently fine-grained data is
examined, growth in income distribution is surprisingly concentrated at the top--
too concentrated to be the result of the changing distribution of jobs. 96 It is even
88. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 11 (2003).
89. See Lawrence F. Katz & David H. Autor, Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings
Inequality, in 3A HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICs 1463, 1469 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card
eds., 1999).
90. Id.
91. See Erik Olin Wright & Rachel E. Dwyer, The Patterns of Job Expansions in the USA: A
Comparison of the 1960s and 1990s, 1 Socio-EcoN. REv. 289, 304 (2003). See also Maarten Goos
& Alan Manning, Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work in Britain, 89 REV.
EcoN. & STAT. 118, 121 & fig.1 (2007) (finding evidence for growth in low quality and high
quality jobs, but contraction for middle quality jobs).
92. See Wright & Dwyer, supra note 91, at 289.
93. David H. Autor et al., Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists, 90 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 300, 301 (2008).
94. Id.
95. See Piketty & Saez, supra note 88, at 33-34.
96. Id. at 34-35.
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possible to question how tightly-linked skills-and education more generally-
are to economic rewards in the labor market.97
What problems do growing economic inequality present? Is increasing
economic inequality wrong? We might question inequality on its own terms, as a
matter of justice. The political philosopher John Rawls argued that, to the extent
that an unequal distribution of rewards was the result of luck, rather than choice,
such a distribution was morally arbitrary. 98 Since much economic inequality can
be explained by such factors as accidents of birth, inequality that is the
consequence of such factors is unjust.99 It can also be argued that inequality is
procedurally as well as substantively unjust. Greater inequality results in a
disproportionate influence of the rich on politics and public-policy making, to the
detriment of the less well off. Inequality therefore undermines the practice of
democracy and vitiates the core constitutional foundation of popular
sovereignty. 10 It is also possible that inequality is inefficient-inequality is not
just bad for the worse off, it may be bad for everyone) ° l
Eliminating public-sector collective bargaining will only worsen these
trends toward growing inequality. To the extent that reductions in public-sector
workers' compensation will be used to finance tax cuts or balance budgets, the
effect will mostly benefit the relatively well off. Like other government
interventions in the labor market-such as minimum wages, social security, or
unemployment insurance-public-sector collective bargaining, and indeed
public-sector employment in general, provides a counterbalance to downward
wage pressure in the private labor market.10 2 This occurs directly, inasmuch as
all collective bargaining tends to reduce earnings inequality. There is an indirect
effect as well: to the extent that public-sector employment provides an alternative
97. See generally, e.g., EDWARD N. WOLFF, DOES EDUCATION REALLY HELP? SKILL, WORK,
AND INEQUALITY (2006) (finding evidence that contradicts the argument that greater educational
attainment will reduce income inequality, including findings that wages have fallen even though
workers' skill levels and educational attainment have increased, that changes in productivity do not
appear strongly correlated with changes in skills or education, and that as educational opportunities
have improved for a broader segment of the U.S. population, income inequality has nevertheless
increased).
98. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14-15 (2005) (arguing that a just distribution of
social and economic advantages should nullify "the accidents of natural endowment and the
contingencies of social circumstance" since they "seem arbitrary from a moral point of view").
99. UNEQUAL CHANCES: FAMILY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS (Samuel Bowles et al.
eds., 2008) (finding evidence that a person's economic success is strongly correlated with the
economic success of his or her parents).
100. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITrTON: A BIOGRAPHY (2006)
(explaining the importance of popular sovereignty in the ratification and interpretation of the
Constitution).
101. Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, 109 Q.J.
ECON. 465,467 (1994).
102. See Torben Iversen & Anne Wren, Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint: The
Trilemma of the Service Economy, 50 WORLD POL. 507, 512-13 (1998) (describing public-sector
employment as one way "government can assume the responsibility for employing workers at
relatively high wages").
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source of "good" jobs for workers, the private sector is forced to raise
compensation in order to compete.
Ironically, critiques that allege the excessive pay of public-sector workers
are implicitly drawing on a concern about inequality. Yet, growing inequality
among all employees presents a far graver concern than whether public-sector
workers are getting paid more than their private-sector counterparts. Indeed, to
the extent that such comparisons invite concerns about the fairness of rewards in
the labor market, they are largely misplaced. Inequality is a problem, but there
are much larger and more important sources for inequality than those that exist
between public- and private-sector workers. Such comparisons engender enmity
where comity should exist.
2. Efficient Functioning of Labor Markets
To the extent that collective bargaining creates inefficiencies in the labor
market or employment relationship, this need not necessarily imply that all
collective bargaining is inefficient. Employment protection may be a blunt
instrument to encourage workers to invest in special skills or assets, but
removing collective bargaining, and the protection it provides, while leaving
nothing in its place, scarcely makes such dilemmas better. Without some form of
security or insurance to protect against job loss or the redundancy of firm-
specific skills, worker will have little incentive to make such risky investments of
time and energy. The same applies to risk in the labor market more generally.
To the extent that matching frictions and efficiency wages are independent
sources of wage dispersion and labor-market risk, the elimination of collective
bargaining does nothing to address them.
Collective bargaining can in fact address these problems in positive ways.
This issue is less whether collective bargaining per se is good or bad, efficient or
inefficient, but what kind of collective bargaining works best.1 3
B. Reforming Public-Sector Labor Law and Bargaining
1. Greater Centralization in Collective Bargaining
One potential solution to a number of problems in public-sector bargaining
might be greater centralization: both across geographic and occupational
boundaries within the public sector and across the public-private boundary.
Doing so might have four salutary effects by reducing: (1) industry and firm
wage differentials; (2) the "insider" politics of public-sector unionism; (3) the
hold-up problem; and (4) the adverse-selection problem.
Greater coordination and centralization in wage setting among unions has
been shown to reduce wage inequality.' °4 Since greater wage disparities make
103. See Justus Haucap & Christian Wey, Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives,
114 ECON. J. C149, C149 (2004) (describing the view that "it is not the mere existence of unions
that is decisive for firms' performance but rather the specific mode of labour market organisation").
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workers more apprehensive about job loss, reducing them should make workers
more willing to accept more labor-market risk, especially where doing so may
also bring greater rewards in productivity.1' 5 I am unaware whether workers are
more likely to move within the public (or private) sector following a job loss, or
between sectors. Depending on the answer to that question, greater coordination
should take place within or between the sectors where workers are most likely to
move.
More generally, wage centralization in collective bargaining could also lead
public-sector unions away from intensive, localist politics that favor "insider"
strategies, of which excessive levels of employment protection is a chief
example. When unions are more focused on improving wage conditions
throughout the labor market, they will lose their interest in protecting particular
jobs and enterprises. For example, if the public interest requires the closing of a
particular municipal department, facility, or service, workers and unions will be
less concerned about waging a bargaining or political battle to defend those jobs,
because workers will know that quality employment is plentiful. More generally,
we might refer to Mancur Olson's argument that "encompassing organizations"
will tend to reduce the level of public bads. 10 6  Small and fractured interest
groups will be powerless to impose high levels of negative externalities on the
public. Medium-sized groups, on the other hand, will have the ability and the
desire to advance their interest at the expense of the public. However, when
groups become large and encompassing enough that they effectively become the
public, they will fully bear the negative externalities their activities create and
will therefore tend to promote a more efficient policy.
As described in Part II.C., decentralized bargaining tends to reduce the
incentives of employers, public or private, to invest in productivity-enhancing
and cost-saving technology. More centralization in wage bargaining will
counteract this effect. Greater coordination, especially between public and
private, could also ease the adverse-selection problem.'0 7  Bargaining
centralization will tend to standardize working conditions between the two
sectors, reducing any disproportions in the prevalence of risk-averse workers. 
08
104. See generally Michael Wallerstein, Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in
Advanced Industrial Societies, 43 AM. J. POL. Sci. 649, 649 (1999) (reporting evidence that the
"most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level [i.e., centralization] of wage-
setting," even when controlling for other factors such as the political persuasion of the government,
government size, international trade openness, the supply of highly educated workers, and other
labor market variables).
105. See Margarita Estevez-Abe et al., Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A
Reinterpretation of the Welfare State, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 145, 153-55 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds.,
2001).
106. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
107. See Wallerstein, supra note 104, at 655-58.
108. Id.
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2. Unemployment Insurance
In addition to greater coordination in wage bargaining, policy should seek
alternative forms of employment security. Chief among these is unemployment
insurance. By replacing a portion of a worker's wages lost from unemployment,
unemployment insurance reduces the costs and risk of job loss. 10 9 However,
unemployment insurance currently replaces on average only about 36% of a
worker's former wages."10 At this level, replacement rates only weakly reduce
the income dislocations experienced by unemployed workers. The current U.S.
replacement rate is also significantly lower than most other developed
countries."' In order to make unemployment insurance an effective employment
security device, and to reduce workers' demand for employment protection rules,
the U.S. replacement rate should be significantly increased.
Increasing the replacement rate in the United States would require
additional tax revenues, a proposal which is likely to encounter fierce political
resistance. Yet improved unemployment insurance could pay for itself. First,
unemployment insurance can provide security in the labor market, without the
productivity reducing characteristics of employment protection rules. Second,
better unemployment insurance can encourage workers to search and apply for
higher-wage, higher productivity jobs, reducing the "tow-wage insurance" effect
described in Part II.C. 12 Since this will likewise encourage employers to create
higher-wage, higher-productivity jobs, the rise in economic activity can offset an
increase in taxes required to pay for improved replacement rates. 13 Third,
unemployment insurance can substitute for whatever efficiency-enhancing
attributes that employment protection rules are believed to have. Chief among
these are the incentives such rules give to employees to invest in firm-specific
skills." 4 Unemployment insurance does not necessarily remove these incentives,
even though it does not keep workers tied to their particular jobs. If workers
invest in specialized skills in the expectation of income gains, rather than because
of an attachment to any particular job, then employment insurance benefits that
replace such income are sufficient to maintain the incentives currently derived
from employment protection measures.'
1 5
109. See Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, Productivity Gains from Unemployment
Insurance, 44 EURO. ECON. REv. 1195, 1197 (2000) [hereinafter Acemoglu & Shimer, Productivity
Gains].
110. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2006:
BOOSTING JOBS AND INCOMES 60 tbl.3.2 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/9/36965805.pdf
(Net Replacement Rates and Employment Insurance Benefit Duration in 26 OECD Countries,
2004).
111. See id.
112. See Acemoglu & Shimer, Productivity Gains, supra note 109, at 1197.
113. Acemoglu & Shimer, Efficient UI, supra note 86, at 23.
114. Estevez-Abe et al., supra note 105, at 150.
115. See Acemoglu & Shimer, Productivity Gains, supra note 109, at 1201-02.
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3. Job Training and Retraining
It can be difficult to find work following a job loss, and this difficulty is
compounded when the worker's skills at the previous job were specific and
perhaps related to an industry in decline. Acquiring new skills is costly, time
consuming, and of sometimes limited value if not obtained while on the job."16
These painful aspects of job loss can be mitigated by policy programs that
subsidize and create job-training opportunities for unemployed workers. Unions
and employers can play an important role here, since both are more aware of job
openings and requirements than are public officials. Again, such programs are
costly, but by improving the match between workers and jobs, they can enhance
economic efficiency by speeding the creation of newer, more productive jobs,
and reduce workers' demands for job protection measures.
Such programs also fit well and naturally with unemployment insurance
programs. In particular, there are two reasons that such job training programs
can speed the rate of exit of workers from unemployment, and thereby reduce the
tax burden of unemployment insurance programs. First, by broadening and
enriching the skill set of unemployed workers, they enhance job opportunities
and the chance of finding new work. 1 7 Second, making participation in a job
training program a condition of the receipt of unemployment benefits encourages
workers who may not particularly need the training to find employment." 8 Job
training programs can be an efficient method of reducing unemployment and
should be encouraged in any reform of the current unemployment system.
4. Privatization
Public-sector monopolies may lead to larger wage demands from unions
and could also limit productivity increases. Yet privatization has become an
increasingly important phenomenon in the public sector." 9 What role should
privatization play in public-sector labor law reform? Privatization is often
promoted as a way of reducing the cost to the taxpaying public. 20 This is a
laudable objective, but if one goal of maintaining a public-sector workforce is to
create a bulwark against income inequality, these two goals may come into
tension. This will be particularly true when the cost savings of privatization are
gained solely through the reduction of wages and living standards for public-
sector workers. Because this is a typical outcome of privatization, labor unions
116. Estevez-Abe et al., supra note 105, at 150.
117. Per Kongshoj Madsen, The Danish Model of "Flexicurity ": Experiences and Lessons, 10
TRANSFER: EuR. REV. LAB. & RES. 187, 197 (2004).
118. Id. See also Dan A. Black et al., Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective
than the Services Themselves? Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System, 93 AM. ECON.
REv. 1313, 1313 (2003).
119. See generally Bennett & DiLorenzo, supra note 57.
120. Id. at 34.
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tend to oppose such measures.' 12 Indeed, it would seem that privatization and
unionism stand in irreconcilable tension with one another.
Yet public-sector workers have an interest in productivity gains, from
which they can benefit through higher wages. If competition can have some
moderating effect on wage demands, this competition from privatization may
serve legitimate purposes in increasing employment and reducing hold-up
problems. In principle, it should be possible to have privatization without
discouraging unionization. Governments should make clear that they will not
award contracts to firms that use anti-union employment tactics; the federal
government has adopted such measures. 122 This will encourage firms contracting
with the government to find cost-saving technologies and methods other than
simply though wage and benefit cuts. To emphasize the previous claim, firms
will also be encouraged to innovate in this way if a greater prevalence of wage
centralization reduces the hold-up problem of union bargaining. While
privatization and unionism currently appear to be at odds, this need not be the
case.
CONCLUSION
Several battleground states have recently attempted to curtail or eliminate
longstanding collective-bargaining rights for public-sector workers. Debates
surrounding these legislative maneuvers have made widely diverging claims
about whether and how much public-sector workers should be compensated
compared to their counterparts in the private sector. This article has sought to
add some analytical focus to the debate by considering an explicit model of
collective bargaining and by identifying specific features of the public sector that
might influence the outcome. The conclusion of this analysis is that even with a
higher prevalence of collective bargaining in the public sector, a number of
factors militate against excessively divergent levels of compensation between
public and private sectors. Among these are the tradeoff between wages and
employment security, lower productivity in the public sector, and wage
dispersion within public, and between public and private, sectors. On the other
hand, the political involvement of unions and the weaker degree of competition
in the public sector suggest compensation may indeed be higher. It is hoped that
further research attempts to explicitly measure these different factors will yield a
more precise understanding of the causes and magnitudes of differences between
public- and private-sector compensation. More speculatively, even if public-
sector compensation is not excessive due to the focus there on employment
security, such a tradeoff may put significant costs on the public. This article has
also considered ways that public-sector unionism can be reformed, to help unions
achieve their egalitarian objectives at minimum public expense, a goal to be
encouraged.
121. Id.
122. See Exec. Order No. 13,496, 29 C.F.R. 471 (2009) (requiring federal contractors to post
notices of employees' federal labor-law rights); Exec. Order No. 13,494, 74 Fed. Reg. 6101 (2009)
(prohibiting the government from paying costs associated with persuading employees to exercise or
not exercise their rights to organize and bargain collectively).

